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1211 
Debt Collectors Allowed to Play Hide and Hope Nobody 
Seeks: Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson and the Future of 
Chapter 13 Bankruptcy  
I. Introduction 
Anna Jones, a hard-working mother of two, found herself with exorbitant 
medical and credit card bills after she was diagnosed with a rare type of lung 
cancer. After her recovery, Anna was left with an overwhelming amount of 
debt. To keep her house from being foreclosed upon after missing a few 
mortgage payments, Anna decided to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
Unfortunately, the Chapter 13 bankruptcy trustee happened to overlook a 
debt from four years prior that was also past the state’s statute of limitations. 
When Anna made a payment on the stale debt, it brought life back into the 
dead claim. If Anna, the bankruptcy trustee, or an attorney had objected to 
the debt during the bankruptcy proceeding, the debt would have been gone 
forever since the statute of limitations makes it unenforceable. However, 
after the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Midland Funding, 
LLC v. Johnson,1 people like Anna will forever be stuck with stale debts after 
a required payment is unwittingly made to rejuvenate them.  
Before the Court’s decision in Midland Funding, some jurisdictions 
utilized a simple solution for when a claim was filed based on a debt 
unenforceable due to the statute of limitations—a debtor could file a claim 
against a debt collector alleging a violation of the Federal Debt Collection 
Practices Act (FDCPA). In 1977, Congress passed the FDCPA2 as part of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act,3 “to eliminate abusive debt collection 
practices by debt collectors” across the United States.4 Under the FDCPA, a 
debt collector may not (1) “use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or 
attempt to collect any debt,”5 (2) “use any false, deceptive, or misleading 
representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt,”6 or 
(3) “engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, 
oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt.”7  
The declaration of purpose of the FDCPA acknowledges the “abundant 
evidence of . . . abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices 
                                                                                                                 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 1407 (2017). 
 2. Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat 2092 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p). 
 3. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1665e (2012)). 
 4. 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2012).  
 5. Id. § 1692f.  
 6. Id. § 1692e. 
 7. Id. § 1692d.  
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[performed] by many debt collectors,”8 and states that the “[e]xisting laws 
and procedures [to correct] these injuries are inadequate to protect 
consumers.”9 These “[a]busive . . . practices contribute to the number of 
personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to 
invasions of individual privacy.”10 Congress recognized the unfairness 
inherent in the debt collection industry and passed the FDCPA to give 
consumers relief from many of the unscrupulous practices of debt collectors.  
The FDCPA’s teeth come in the form of injunctive relief and actual 
damages along with additional damages as the court may deem appropriate 
(but not to exceed $1000), the costs of the action, and attorney’s fees for any 
successful action to enforce the Act.11 The FDCPA has been referenced as a 
strict liability statute,12 and a violation of any provision causes a debt 
collector to be liable under the Act. However, “[a] debt collector may not be 
held liable under [the FDCPA] if the debt collector shows by a preponderance 
of evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona 
fide error.”13 The debt collector also must show it maintained procedures that 
were “reasonably adapted to avoid such an error.”14  
Anna Jones, and many other Americans just like her, must now take extra 
precautions when filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy to avoid paying money to 
a debt collector who is not legally owed. This widespread issue will continue 
to plague the bankruptcy system since the Supreme Court has given debt 
collectors another avenue of securing payment on unenforceable claims in 
Midland Funding. This Note will discuss the history of bankruptcy and how 
the FDCPA interacts with those proceedings in Part II. Part III details the 
circuit split leading up to Midland Funding. Part IV takes a closer look at the 
case in question. Part V examines why the Supreme Court reached the wrong 
conclusion in Midland Funding, and what can be done about it. Part VI 
concludes this Note. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 8. Id. § 1692(a).  
 9. Id. § 1692(b).  
 10. Id. § 1692(a).  
 11. Id. §§ 1692k(a)(1)-(2)(A), (3). Conversely, the defendant (a debt collector) may only 
receive “attorney’s fees [if the] action . . . was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of 
harassment.” Id. § 1692k(a)(3). 
 12. See Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Servs., Inc., 460 F.3d 1162, 1175 (9th Cir. 
2006). 
 13. Id. § 1692k(c). 
 14. Id. 
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II. History of Bankruptcy  
Recently, there has been a rise in litigation involving the FDCPA in 
bankruptcy proceedings. To understand the conflict, it is important to 
understand the history, purpose, and realities of bankruptcy. “The principal 
purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but 
unfortunate debtor.’”15 For an individual contemplating filing for 
bankruptcy, the primary options are Chapter 7 or Chapter 13. Chapter 7 
bankruptcy is also known as liquidation.16 In a Chapter 7 proceeding, all of 
the individual’s assets that are not exempt are sold to pay off the outstanding 
debts.17 Chapter 7 bankruptcy is typically favored by individual debtors 
because it allows individuals to have their debts discharged at the conclusion 
of the liquidation18 and ultimately is a quicker process. Although Chapter 7 
bankruptcy remains the typical first choice for individual debtors, Congress 
recently enacted a “means test” individuals must pass to file for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy. If the individual’s income is over the stipulated amount on the 
test, he is unable to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy19 and must look to other 
options such as Chapter 13 bankruptcy. 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is titled “Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with 
Regular Income,” but is typically referred to as a reorganization.20 Chapter 
13 is only for individuals with less “[t]han $394,725 of [u]nsecured [d]ebt or 
$1,184,200 of [s]ecured [d]ebt.”21 In a Chapter 13 proceeding, a payment 
plan is created that typically lasts three to five years depending on the filer’s 
situation.22 The plan “provide[s] for the submission of all or such portion of 
future earnings or other future income of the debtor to the supervision and 
control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan.”23 The plan 
“may provide for less than full payment of all amounts owed for a claim 
entitled to priority . . . only if the plan provides that all of the debtor's 
projected disposable income for a 5-year period . . . will be applied to make 
                                                                                                                 
 15. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 526, 522 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas 
Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017) (quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365, 
367 (2007)).  
 16. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (2012).  
 17. Id. §§ 725-726.  
 18. Id. § 727.  
 19. Id. § 707.  
 20. See id. § 1322; see also In re Reg'l Bldg. Sys., Inc., 254 F.3d 528, 532 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 21. Cara O’Neill, What Are the Differences Between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy?, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/what-is-the-difference-
between-chapter-7-chapter-13-bankrutpcy.html.  
 22. Id. 
 23. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1).  
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payments under the plan.”24 After the three- or five-year payment plan is 
complete, the bankruptcy proceeding discharges the remaining debt.  
One advantage of Chapter 13 bankruptcy is that it benefits homeowners. 
If the individual filing bankruptcy is attempting to save a house from 
foreclosure, Chapter 13 might be the best option as liens can be stripped at 
the conclusion of the payment plan.25 The drawback is that the individual 
must make monthly payments to the trustee for three to five years.26 This is 
a difficult and lengthy process, and a recent study showed that less than half 
of those who filed under Chapter 13 ultimately made it through their plans 
and had their debts discharged.27 The cases below focus on Chapter 13 
bankruptcy and involve claims paid over a period of three to five years, as 
opposed to Chapter 7 proceedings which involve liquidating all assets to split 
the proceeds among creditors. This distinction becomes important when 
addressing the rights of creditors with claims that are unenforceable based on 
the statute of limitations in Chapter 13 bankruptcy.  
Debt buying today has become a massive industry. In 2013, third-party 
debt collection agencies “recovered [approximately] $55.2 billion in total 
debt . . . earn[ing close to] $10.4 billion in commissions and fees.”28 In 2016, 
approximately $3.7 trillion of consumer credit was outstanding.29 With these 
large amounts of outstanding debt, third-party debt collectors have an 
incentive to buy debt for a discount from companies who are not experienced 
in the debt collection process. The longer the debt remains outstanding, the 
larger the typical discount becomes on the old debt. Third-party debt 
collection agencies then purchase old debt for pennies on the dollar. 
Recognizing the realities of the debt buying process is important for a full 
understanding of the issue facing the courts.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. § 1322(a)(4).  
 25. O’Neill, supra note 20. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Ed Flynn, Success Rates in Chapter 13, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2017, at 38, 39, 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/abi-org-corp/journals/numbers_08-17.pdf. 
 28. ERNST & YOUNG, THE IMPACT OF THIRD-PARTY DEBT COLLECTION ON THE U.S. 
NATIONAL AND STATE ECONOMIES IN 2013, at 3 (2014), https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20170518103428/http://www.wacollectors.org/Media/Default/PDFs/_images_21594_impact
economies2014.pdf. 
 29. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL 
RELEASE: CONSUMER CREDIT: MAY 2017 (2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/g19/20170710/g19.pdf.  
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III. Law Before the Case 
In recent years, the circuit courts were tasked with deciding a series of 
cases after numerous lawsuits with similar facts were brought against debt 
collectors following a Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Courts across the nation were 
forced to determine whether the debt collectors’ practice of filing proofs of 
claims that were unenforceable due to the applicable state’s statute of 
limitations was a violation of the FDCPA. Under Chapter 13 bankruptcy, “[a] 
proof of claim may be filed by any entity that holds a claim against the 
debtor” for a consumer debt.30 The Eleventh Circuit held this practice does 
violate the FDCPA,31 while the Eighth,32 Seventh,33 and Fourth34 Circuits 
refused to extend FDCPA claims to time-barred proofs of claim.35 
A. The Eleventh Circuit Decided Filing a Time-Barred Claim Violated the 
FDCPA 
In Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, Stanley Crawford had filed for 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy in Alabama.36 LVNV filed a proof of claim to collect 
on a debt it had purchased, even though the statute of limitations expired four 
years earlier.37 The bankruptcy trustee paid on the claim, but four years later 
the debtor objected to the claim.38 Crawford then filed a counterclaim 
alleging the practice violated the FDCPA.39 The court in Crawford 
considered whether debtors can pursue FDCPA claims against creditors 
filing claims that are barred by the statute of limitations in Chapter 13 
bankruptcy proceedings.40 The Eleventh Circuit, the first circuit to consider 
                                                                                                                 
 30. 11 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(2) (2012). 
 31. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). The Second 
Circuit similarly held that filing a proof of claim, even if invalid, is not a violation of the 
FDCPA. See also Simmons v. Roundup Funding, LLC, 622 F.3d 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 32. Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017). 
 33. Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017). 
 34. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 5335 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017). 
 35. Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014); Owens v. 
LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 
(2017); In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 533 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas 
Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).  
 36. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 1257. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 1259.  
 39. Id. at 1257. 
 40. Id. at 1256-57. 
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this question, held that the practice of filing claims for stale debts gave a 
misleading impression and violated the FDCPA.41  
The court reasoned that just as a debt collector would have violated the 
FDCPA by filing a lawsuit on time-barred claims in state court, LVNV’s 
filing of a claim past the statute of limitations in bankruptcy court also 
violated the FDCPA.42 Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Goldberg 
stated, “[f]ederal circuit and district courts have uniformly held that a debt 
collector's threatening to sue on a time-barred debt and/or filing a time-barred 
suit in state court to recover that debt violates §§ 1692e and 1692f” of the 
FDCPA.43 The court also noted that “[s]tatutes of limitations ‘protect 
defendants and the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search 
for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death 
or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of 
documents, or otherwise.’”44 
Most notably, the court used a “least sophisticated” debtor standard in its 
analysis.45 The stale claim that slips through the cracks in a bankruptcy 
proceeding ultimately harms the true creditors and the debtor. Therefore, the 
least sophisticated debtor in a Chapter 13 proceeding may not be aware the 
claim is time-barred and unenforceable and may not object to the stale 
claim.46 To the Eleventh Circuit, the filing of a stale claim is “‘unfair,’ 
‘unconscionable,’ ‘deceptive,’ and ‘misleading’ within the broad scope of § 
1692e and § 1692f.”47  
B. Numerous Other Circuits Decided the Time-Barred Claim Did Not 
Violate the FDCPA 
Three circuits have considered similar facts to the ones present in 
Crawford and reached opposite conclusions.48 Such was the case in Owens 
v. LVNV Funding, LLC, in which the Seventh Circuit addressed a 
consolidated appeal.49 In each case, “a debt collector filed a proof of 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Id. at 1261. 
 42. Id. at 1262. 
 43. Id. at 1259.  
 44. Id. at 1260 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979)). 
 45. Id. at 1261.  
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  
 48. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 533 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas 
Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017); Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 
736-37 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 
Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017). 
 49. Owens, 832 F.3d at 729.  
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claim . . . for a time-barred debt in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.”50 
After objecting, each “debtor sued the debt collector,” alleging the practice 
violated the FDCPA.51 Unlike the Eleventh Circuit, the Seventh Circuit 
granted the debt collector’s motion to dismiss and found no violation of the 
FDCPA.52 The majority based its reasoning on the fact that filing a stale debt 
claim is not “per se illegal under the FDCPA,” because the definition of 
“claim” in the Bankruptcy Code is not merely limited to legally enforceable 
claims.53 While the debtors argued “the term ‘claim’ [should only include] 
legally enforceable obligations,” the court explained that as defined in the 
Bankruptcy Code, “claim” means a “right to payment, whether or not such 
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, 
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or 
unsecured.”54 The court also emphasized that “the statute of limitations . . . 
does not extinguish the underlying debt”—it merely makes the claim 
unenforceable.55  
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that because bankruptcy proceedings 
require a disclosure about the status and origin of the debt, there is a greater 
chance the debtor or trustee will notice a time-barred debt.56 Further, the court 
noted the “misleading or deceptive nature of the conduct are less acute when 
a proof of claim is filed in bankruptcy, especially in a counseled case, as 
opposed to when a lawsuit is filed in state or federal court.”57 The court 
ultimately reasoned that filing proofs of claims that are barred by the statute 
of limitations is not “deceptive, misleading, unfair, or otherwise abusive as 
prohibited under the FDCPA.”58 Judge Wood disagreed with the majority’s 
opinion and argued that because bankruptcy courts are similar to state and 
federal courts, the same rule regarding the FDCPA should apply.59 The 
dissent pointed out that trustees will not catch every stale claim, and this 
allows for abuse of the system.60  
                                                                                                                 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 737. 
 53. Id. at 730.  
 54. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012)). 
 55. Id. at 731. 
 56. Id. at 733. 
 57. Id. at 735. 
 58. Id. at 736-37. 
 59. Id. at 738 (Wood, C.J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. at 740-41. 
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The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion as the Seventh Circuit 
with the case In re Dubois.61 Kimberly Adkins and Chaille Dubois filed 
separate Chapter 13 bankruptcy petitions.62 Atlas Acquisitions LLC then 
filed proofs of claims in their respective bankruptcy cases on debts that were 
barred by Maryland’s statute of limitations.63 The court ultimately held that 
Atlas’s claim and conduct did not violate the FDCPA.  
The court first clarified that filing a proof of claim is regulated by the 
FDCPA, emphasizing a broad definition of “claim.”64 Therefore, a properly 
filed claim is allowed unless a party (trustee or debtor) objects.65 Even though 
“[f]ederal courts have consistently held that a debt collector violates the 
FDCPA by filing a lawsuit or threatening to file a lawsuit to collect a time-
barred debt,”66 the Fourth Circuit pointed to three reasons why bankruptcy 
proceedings are different than other court systems.67 First, the court noted 
that “[b]ankruptcy [r]ules require claims . . . to accurately state the last 
transaction and charge-off date,” making it easier to show that a debt is time-
barred.68 Second, the court reiterated that the bankruptcy debtor has a trustee 
and is often represented by council, and both are responsible for objecting.69 
Lastly, Chapter 13 debtors voluntarily initiate the proceeding, and they are 
often less likely to be embarrassed about objecting to stale claims.70 In 
summary, the court determined “the FDCPA does not reach Atlas’s 
conduct.”71 
The dissent, written by Judge Diaz, agreed with the court in Crawford and 
the dissent of Judge Wood in Owens, arguing that the practice of allowing 
stale debts in bankruptcy is misleading and unfair, and provides an action 
under the FDCPA.72 Diaz argued that the FDCPA is purposefully broad to 
                                                                                                                 
 61. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas 
Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017). 
 62. Id. at 525. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 528. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 527.  
 67. Id. at 532. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 535 (Diaz, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. at 533; see also Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); Crawford v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 758 F.3d 
1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). 
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combat abusive behavior by debt collectors.73 Unsophisticated debtors may 
not know of a statute of limitations defense for old debts, and without an 
objection the claim will be added to the plan.74 Most importantly, the dissent 
argued this practice is an unfair abuse of the system: 
At best, a debt collector who files such a claim wastes the trustee's 
time. At worst, the debt collector catches the trustee asleep at the 
switch and collects on an invalid claim to the detriment of other 
creditors and, in many cases, the debtor. In either case, the debt 
collector misleadingly represents to the debtor that it is entitled to 
collect through bankruptcy when it is not.75 
In Nelson v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., the Eighth Circuit also 
weighed in on the issue, holding that the practice of filing a stale proof of 
claim in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy does not lead to liability under the 
FDCPA.76 In Nelson, Domick Nelson defaulted on $751 of consumer debt 
and subsequently filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.77 Midland Credit 
Management filed a proof of claim for the time-barred debt.78 Nelson then 
sued Midland alleging violation of the FDCPA.79 Refusing to extend the 
FDCPA to time-barred proofs of claim, the Eighth Circuit sided with the 
Seventh and Fourth Circuits.80 Thus, the majority of the circuits to address 
this issue have limited the reach of the FDCPA in the Chapter 13 context.  
IV. Statement of the Case 
In Midland Funding, LLC, v. Johnson, Aleida Johnson filed for Chapter 
13 bankruptcy.81 Midland Funding, LLC then filed a proof of claim stating 
that Johnson owed Midland $1,879.71 in credit-card debt.82 Midland’s claim 
stated that the last charge on Johnson’s account was more than ten years old, 
                                                                                                                 
 73. In re Dubois, 834 F.3d at 533 (Diaz, J., dissenting). 
 74. See id. at 534. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Nelson v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 828 F.3d 749, 752 (8th Cir. 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017).  
 77. Id. at 750.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. See id. at 752; see also Owens v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 832 F.3d 726, 736-37 (7th 
Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2157 (2017); In re Dubois, 834 F.3d 522, 535 (4th Cir. 
2016), cert. denied sub nom. Dubois v. Atlas Acquisitions, LLC, 137 S. Ct. 2158 (2017). 
 81. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, 137 S. Ct. 1407, 1411 (2017).  
 82. Id.  
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but Alabama’s applicable statute of limitations was six years.83 Johnson’s 
counsel objected to it, and the bankruptcy court agreed by refusing to allow 
the stale claim.84 Johnson then filed suit against Midland Funding for 
violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.85 
The district court held that the FDCPA was not applicable in this case, but 
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed.86 The issue in 
this case was similar to the issue in all the previously discussed cases: 
whether a debt collector’s filing of a known time-barred claim violates the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.87 Ultimately, the Supreme Court held the 
practice of filing a claim for a debt barred by the statute of limitations in a 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy does not violate the Fair Debt Collections Practices 
Act.88 
A. The Supreme Court’s Analysis 
The Court began by explaining that the word “‘claim’ is a ‘right to 
payment’”, and is dictated by state law.89 Alabama, along with “many other 
[s]tates, provides that a creditor has the right to payment” even after the 
statute of limitations has expired, but the statute of limitations extinguishes 
the remedy.90 Johnson argued the word “claim” in the Bankruptcy Code 
means “enforceable claim,” but the Court disagreed and explained that the 
Bankruptcy Code provisions do not say “enforceable claim” in the 
definition.91 The Court also used § 101(5)(A), defining a claim as a right to 
payment regardless of whether it is “contingent . . . [or] disputed.”92 The 
majority further explained that an expiration of the statute of limitations has 
long been treated as an affirmative defense.93 
To determine whether a debt collector who knowingly files a time barred 
claim in bankruptcy violates the FDCPA, the Court looked to five relevant 
words in the FDCPA: false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or 
unconscionable.94 The Court declared that the practice of filing a proof of 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id.; ALA. CODE § 6-2-34 (2014).  
 84. Midland, 137 S. Ct. at 1411.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1411-12.  
 91. Id. at 1412.  
 92. Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012) (emphasis omitted)).  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. at 1411. 
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claim known to be past the statute of limitations is not “false, deceptive or 
misleading,” because even though the claim was time barred, it was still a 
valid claim.95 However, analyzing the practice under the terms “unfair” or 
“unconscionable” required a closer analysis.96  
Johnson argued that multiple lower courts found it “unfair” for debt 
collectors to file claims known to be time barred in civil actions to collect a 
debt.97 The Court, however, pointed to the differences in the bankruptcy 
context versus a debt collector filing a civil action to justify a different 
treatment of the same claim.98 Since Chapter 13 bankruptcies involve a 
trustee, along with the debtor filing the initial bankruptcy action, the Court 
reasoned these factors “make it considerably more likely that an effort to 
collect upon a stale claim in bankruptcy will be met with resistance, 
objection, and disallowance.”99 
The Court further explained raising an affirmative defense of untimeliness 
for stale claims could be beneficial to a debtor because the ultimate 
disallowance of the claim discharges the debt.100 However, the burden is still 
on the debtor to know to dispute the stale claim in the first place, and this 
requires knowledge of the law by consumers. The Court’s logic discounts the 
negative implications of an overlooked stale debt that continues to be paid by 
an unknowing debtor, even though the claim is not legally enforceable. The 
Court also mentioned that holding otherwise “would permit postbankruptcy 
litigation” without the Bankruptcy Code providing for such a remedy.101 
Thus, the majority reasoned that the filing of a manifestly time barred proof 
of claim in Chapter 13 bankruptcy by a debt collector is not considered a 
false, deceptive, misleading, unfair, or unconscionable practice under the 
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  
B. The Dissent’s Evaluation  
Not all members of the Court joined the majority opinion in Midland 
Funding, LLC, v. Johnson. The dissent (Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and 
Kagan) began by pointing out the realities of modern debt collection practices 
in the United States. Many debts today “are increasingly likely to end up in 
the hands of professional debt collectors—companies whose business it is to 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e-f) (2012)). 
 96. Id. at 1413. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1413-14. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1414. 
 101. Id. at 1415. 
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collect debts that are owed to other companies.”102 These companies can 
purchase the old debt “for pennies on the dollar.”103 Once the state statute of 
limitations has run, the debt purchaser’s only hope is that the debtor will fail 
to invoke the statute of limitations or appear to defend themselves once a 
claim is filed in state court.104 However, over 90% of consumers do not 
appear for these court cases.105 Justice Sotomayor emphasized that “[e]very 
court to have considered the question has held that a debt collector that 
knowingly files suit in court to collect a time-barred debt violates the 
FDCPA.”106 Barred in state courts, the debt buyers are now looking to 
bankruptcy proceedings—specifically those falling under Chapter 13—to 
attempt to collect on their stale debt.107  
While the majority contends that bankruptcy’s structural features reduce 
the risk of unnoticed stale debt, the dissent points out that everyone with 
actual experience insists this is false.108 For example, the United States 
argued in its amicus curiae brief that trustees “cannot realistically be expected 
to identify every time-barred . . . claim filed in every bankruptcy.”109 The 
trustees, in their own amicus curiae brief, classified “the practice as 
‘wasteful’ and ‘exploit[ative].’”110 The majority also reasoned that the person 
filing for bankruptcy is more sophisticated than a debtor in a civil suit 
because he made the choice to file.111 However, the dissent reminded that 
people filing for bankruptcy are declaring to the court they are unable to meet 
their bills and are in need of assistance.112 Although the party filing the initial 
lawsuit is reversed, it is not true that the debtor in bankruptcy is in a superior 
position to that of a debtor in a typical civil suit.113 Additionally, the majority 
suggests that sometimes a consumer will benefit if a claim is filed.114 This is 
not a realistic representation of practice.115 If there is a failure to object to the 
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stale claim, debtors could end up worse off than if they had not entered into 
bankruptcy in the first place.116 This practice of allowing debt collectors to 
bet on legally unenforceable claims slipping past unknowing debtors is 
unfair.  
The dissent correctly recognizes that the practice of knowingly filing 
claims that are unenforceable based on statutes of limitations “‘manipulates 
the bankruptcy process by systematically shifting the burden’ to trustees and 
debtors to object even to ‘frivolous claims’—especially given that filing an 
objection is costly, time consuming, and easy to overlook.”117 Stated 
differently, “[d]ebt collectors do not file these claims in good faith; they file 
them hoping and expecting that the bankruptcy system will fail.”118 The 
dissent also states that the FDCPA and Bankruptcy Code were intended to 
“coexist,” meaning FDCPA claims are not barred by the Bankruptcy Code.119 
The dissent points out that Congress can amend the FDCPA to make it clear 
that filing stale proofs of claim in bankruptcy actions is a violation of the 
Act.120 Justice Sotomayor correctly notes the inherent unfairness in allowing 
debt collectors to game the bankruptcy system by filing stale claims; the 
practice is unfair to the bankruptcy filer, trustee, and other creditors with 
valid claims.  
V. Why Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson Was Wrongly Decided 
Allowing debt collectors to take advantage of debtors by filing time-barred 
proofs of claims in bankruptcy cases, when they would otherwise be 
prohibited from collecting in a typical civil lawsuit, contravenes the purpose 
of the FDCPA and undermines the protections of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Bankruptcy courts have limited resources to process objections, and those 
resources should not be exhausted processing objections that are based on 
unenforceable, stale claims that should never have been filed. Considering 
the realities of debt buying today, the history of unenforceable claims deemed 
a violation of the FDCPA, attempts by debt collectors to undermine statutes 
of limitations, and the extra burden placed on trustees to filter through extra 
claims, one can understand the reasoning of the dissent in Midland Funding, 
LLC v. Johnson.  
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A. Realities of Debt Collection Practices Today 
An overview of the modern debt-buying system is essential in order to 
better understand the policy issues at hand. Purchasing stale debt is big 
business. Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson will likely impact the rights of 
individuals filing for Chapter 13 bankruptcy and create a large burden for 
Chapter 13 trustees. The United States, representing the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, and the United States trustees stressed the realities of the 
debtor, creditor, and debt collector relationship today, and stated that debt 
buying is a substantial part of the debt-collection business today.121 One 
analysis from 2006-2009 showed “debt buyers paid on average 7.9 cents per 
dollar for debts less than three years old, 3.1 cents per dollar for debts three 
to six years old, 2.2 cents per dollar for debts six to 15 years old, and 
effectively nothing for debts more than 15 years old.”122  
Every state has a statute of limitations period for suits involving collection 
of unpaid debts, typically “between three to six years,” and none “longer than 
[fifteen] years.”123 It is the debt collector’s job to find a way to make money 
off stale claims, even if they are supposed to be unenforceable. Even though 
the Bankruptcy Code allows the trustee and other creditors to object to stale 
claims, it is inevitable that some stale proofs of claims will escape detection 
because of the volume of bankruptcy litigation.124 The United States pointed 
out that deliberately filing proofs of claims for debts known to be 
unenforceable “reflects a calculated effort to exploit the imperfections of the 
[Bankruptcy] Code’s disallowance mechanisms, and to prevent the claims-
allowance process from functioning as Congress intended.”125  
B. Every State Court to Decide the Issue Has Agreed the Practice Violates 
the FDCPA 
All other courts to confront the issue of debt collectors filing suit in order 
to knowingly collect a time-barred debt have held that such suits violate the 
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FDCPA’s mandate.126 Now that debt collectors have been disallowed from 
filing lawsuits in typical civil courts, they look to bankruptcy to prey on 
ignorant filers.127 Although there are different management mechanisms in 
bankruptcy proceedings, the practice is still “unfair” and “misleading.” In 
cases outside of bankruptcy, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
specifically disallows attorneys from signing off on any document filed in 
court where the claims are not warranted by existing law.128 Federal courts 
agree that Rule 11 is violated when a plaintiff knows or can easily discover 
his claim is “barred by an ‘obvious’ affirmative defense” such as a statute of 
limitations defense.129 Filing stale proofs of claim should be treated the same 
in the bankruptcy context. Such a practice is unfair under the FDCPA because 
“a creditor that knowingly files a proof of claim for a time-barred debt seeks 
money that it can obtain only if the bankruptcy system fails to operate as 
Congress intended.”130 This behavior is abusive and forces the trustee to 
spend time and resources to object to a claim it otherwise would not have to 
object to.  
C. Debt Collectors Should Not Be Allowed to Undermine Statutes of 
Limitations 
Statutes of limitations serve numerous purposes. First, they protect against 
the unfairness of forcing someone to defend a stale claim after his memories 
have faded and witnesses or other evidence can no longer be found.131 Second, 
statutes of limitations protect against “fraud-minded plaintiffs who may assert 
fraudulent claims at a time when the true facts can no longer be proved.”132 
Third, they provide closure to potential defendants and the public at large 
because liability will not extend forever and cause uncertainty in the 
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market.133 Lastly, statutes of limitations “promote the goal of efficient judicial 
administration.”134  
Debt collectors should not be able to undermine well-known and long-
accepted statutes of limitations that serve important policy functions. Allowing 
debt collectors to attempt to evade the statute of limitations by filing claims 
they hope will be overlooked allows debt collectors to act in bad faith. As 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent correctly points out, this practice is both unfair and 
unconscionable under the FDCPA.135 
D. The Practice of Allowing Creditors to File Time-Barred Proofs of Claim 
Increases the Burden on Bankruptcy Trustees 
Even though the bankruptcy context offers more protections to debtors than 
a typical civil claim would,136 this does not mean that filing time-barred claims 
should be allowed. As Judge Diaz’s dissenting opinion pointed out in In re 
Dubois, at best the debt collector “wastes the trustee’s time,” and at worst the 
trustee overlooks the stale claim, meaning the debt collector collects on an 
invalid claim “to the detriment of other” valid creditors and the debtor.137 
Allowing stale claims and then expecting the bankruptcy trustee to object to 
those claims is a wasteful and inefficient use of the trustee’s time and the state’s 
resources. Expecting trustees to catch and object to every claim that is past the 
state’s statute of limitations is also not realistic.138 Instead of shifting the burden 
to the unknowing consumer, the overworked trustee, and the other proper 
creditors, these time-barred claims should not be allowed in the first place.  
E. The Practice Is Fundamentally Unfair 
Invoking the judicial process to enforce a debt should only be allowed when 
the creditor has a good-faith reason to believe the debt is enforceable. The 
National Association of Chapter Thirteen Trustees supported Johnson stating, 
“Midland’s defense is essentially that creditors have a right to see whether their 
claims will slip through the cracks . . . .”139 The amicus brief highlighted the 
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problem that information disclosed in the proof of claim is not always 
sufficient to determine if the claim is past the statute of limitations.140 The 
trustees pointed out that they have a “fiduciary dut[y] to the estate,” and “are 
often pitted against debtors in chapter 13 matters.”141 Even if stale claims are 
more likely to be caught in bankruptcy proceedings, this does not solve the 
problem of some claims escaping detection or slipping through the cracks in 
the system. The only reason for a creditor to file a time-barred claim is the hope 
that it goes unnoticed and that a debtor makes a payment to rejuvenate the stale 
debt. The Supreme Court instead should have disallowed these unenforceable 
claims to be filed to begin with.  
Bankruptcy experts Kenneth Klee and Whitman Holt agree that Midland 
Funding is an unfortunate decision and “not how Congress would have 
intended the bankruptcy system to function.”142 This sentiment is echoed by 
the dissent’s warning that “the law should not be a trap for the unwary.”143 As 
the practice of filing stale claims is fundamentally unfair, there must be 
recourse for affected debtors. The best and easiest recourse is the FDCPA, as 
it was originally intended to level the playing field and grant consumer relief. 
F. Opportunities for Future Change 
Since the Supreme Court has already decided the issue, consumers must 
now look to the legislature for change. Congress has the power to change both 
the FDCPA and the Bankruptcy Code to prohibit time-barred claims by debt 
collectors and sanction those who make such frivolous claims. Congress could 
clarify within the FDCPA that such a practice is “unfair” or “misleading.” As 
for enforcement under the FDCPA, Congress could include an action for debt 
collectors who file stale debt proofs of claims in bankruptcy proceedings—
specifically Chapter 13. Congress could also change the Bankruptcy Code to 
disallow claims past the statute of limitations and change the definition of a 
claim in the bankruptcy context to “enforceable claim.”  
If Congress fails to act, however, all hope is not lost. Another avenue of 
recourse may include courts that are willing to use their rule 9011 sanctioning 
power against debt collectors who regularly file stale proofs they know to be 
uncollectible.144 Associations, such as the National Association of Chapter 
Thirteen Trustees, could also create a streamlined process for detecting and 
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objecting to stale claims.145 Whatever the future of the law may hold, it is 
especially important today for lawyers and those filing for bankruptcy to be 
aware of potential stale claims and to properly file an objection.  
VI. Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson is a 
regrettable decision that failed to appreciate the realities of today’s debt buying 
industry and the targeted practices the FDCPA aims to prevent. The Court took 
a narrow view when interpreting what “claim” encompasses instead of siding 
with those that believe allowing a stale debt claim goes against the purpose and 
policy of bankruptcy and the FDCPA. This narrow interpretation of “claim” is 
problematic. The purpose of the FDCPA is to prevent unfair debt collection 
practices. Because there are multiple policy considerations for why filing a 
claim past the statute of limitations is unfair, filing such a claim should not be 
allowed. The purpose of bankruptcy is to grant a fresh start to the debtor and 
fairly divide the assets among the creditors. Every state has enacted statutes of 
limitations, and it is unfair to allow a debt collector to game the system to bet 
on a claim slipping through the cracks.  
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court took such a technical approach to 
an issue that should have been decided differently based on the realities of the 
debt buying industry and the purposes behind both bankruptcy and the 
FDCPA. A wiser and simpler approach would be to disallow claims that are 
knowingly past the statute of limitations. This creates clarity and does not 
reward debt collectors when they file claims they hope will go unnoticed. 
Every other court to consider the issue of time-barred claims outside of 
bankruptcy agrees that such a practice is a violation of the FDCPA because it 
is unfair. Stale claims in the bankruptcy context should not be treated any 
differently. These claims plague the bankruptcy system; frustrate its ultimate 
purpose; and waste the time of the trustee, bankruptcy filer, and other proper 
creditors.  
The lamentable reality is that debt collectors are allowed to file proofs of 
claims that are time-barred. As a practice point, attorneys, trustees, and other 
creditors must be careful to watch for these stale claims and object to them. 
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